Towards more effective assistance in Security Sector Reform by Ehrhart, Hans-Georg et al.
1Hamburger Informationen
Nachrichten – Kurzberichte – Analysen – Forschungsprojekte – Pressemitteilungen – Materialien – Dokumente
zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik
INSTITUT FÜR FRIEDENSFORSCHUNG UND SICHERHEITSPOLITIK
an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH)              22587 Hamburg  •  Falkenstein 1
Ausgabe 34/2002                Hamburg, Juni 2002
Towards More Effective Assistance in Security Sector Reform
Policy Brief
Based on the IFSH/United Nations University Project
”The Role of the Military in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding”1
Prepared by: Hans-Georg Ehrhart (IFSH), Albrecht Schnabel (UNU) and Monica Blagescu (UNU)2
1. Introduction
Security sector reform (SSR) is generally regarded as
the policy framework through which a growing number
of donors address security problems in post-conflict
societies. SSR must be understood as an integral part of
the overall process of post-conflict peacebuilding. By the
same token, developments in SSR depend on, and shape,
the wider dynamics of the reconstruction process.
The overall aim of SSR is to enable states to ensure
national defense and protect citizens within policy and
budgetary constraints that are consistent with national
development goals. Besides its military-driven goals,
SSR should maximize the capacity of all security actors
so that they actively contribute to social, economic and
political development.
Among others, SSR needs to consider the following
issues:
- transition from military regimes;
- the challenge of divided societies;
- size and budget of security forces;
- disarmament and demobilization (reintegration of
soldiers);
- democratization;
- and issues of good governance.
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Fontana (Central University of Venezuela), Jusuf Fuduli (American
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22. Principles and criteria
The restructuring of the security sector is inextricably
determined by the specific context within which such
initiatives occur. It is therefore difficult to advocate a
general strategy that can be adopted by different
governments in the restructuring of civil-military relations
in their own country. It is possible, however, to provide
a generic set of principles, criteria and methodological
assumptions that will be applicable to all transformation
processes regardless of historical, political and cultural
peculiarities.
Any attempt to engage in a process of security sector
reform should explicitly  outline those principles on
which security sector reform will be based. The following
broad principles are proposed as foundations in this
regard and should, ideally, find reflection in the appro-
priate constitutional provisions, legislative frameworks,
standard operating procedures and institutional culture
of the armed forces themselves:
- The principle of civil supremacy entails four key
principles, which should be respected by both the civil
authorities and the armed forces in the execution of
their respective responsibilities; namely the principles
of the separation of powers, legality, accountability,
and transparency.
- Decisions on the roles, responsibilities, tasks,
organizational features, and personnel requirements
of the security forces should be made in accordance to
the circumstances of a developing country engaged in
a difficult and complex transition.
- The determination of the roles, responsibilities, tasks,
organizational features, resource requirements and
personnel requirements of the security forces should
be done in a manner that is affordable to the country
concerned particularly in light of a limited resource
base and pressing demands on its budget from all
sectors of society.
- The roles and responsibilities of the security sector
should be enshrined in the Constitution. The
Constitution should ensure that the security sector will
respect human rights as reflected in the Constitution,
domestic and international law, and will understand
and operate within the framework of the democratic
process within the country concerned.
- Security forces should be non-partisan in their political
behavior and should not further the interests of and/or
involve themselves in political activities.
- The conduct of security policy and the management of
security matters shall be handled in a consultative and
transparent manner and shall encourage a high level of
parliamentary and public participation without endan-
gering the lives of personnel and without prejudicing
the ability of the security forces to conduct legal and
legitimate operations.
- National security shall be sought primarily through
efforts to meet the political, economic, social and
cultural rights of the country’s people; and the activities
of the security sector shall be subordinate to and
supportive of these efforts.
- Both the political authorities and the leadership of the
armed forces and other security sector actors shall
strive to build and maintain high levels of dialogue and
partnership in all their dealings with one another. Such
collaboration should be predicated on regular and
continuous interaction between these interlinked
communities and will occur within the hierarchy of
authority and oversight as established in the country
concerned.
3. Main challenges
Most developing countries continue to face threats
and challenges to their national interests, sovereignty
and internal stability that will continue to require the
maintenance, preparation and deployment of security
forces in a variety of roles in the medium to long-term.
Typically these tasks, based on a preliminary assessment
of the country’s strategic environment, will require the
maintenance of the capabilities to execute a wide variety
of secondary and ”non-traditional” operations (peace
missions, internal law and order responsibilities and, in
some cases, reconstruction and development tasks).
In this context, internal and external actors face – and
must respond to – the following challenges:
- The armed forces’ traditional role of external defense
is no longer suitable to address today’s needs for
participation in the complex spectrum of peace support
operations. These additional roles have to be
incorporated into armed forces doctrine, organization
and training.
- In a post-conflict settlement setting, peacekeeping
functions have been modified and expanded to such
areas as maintaining public order and providing
logistical support for political and social transition.
International security forces need to be prepared to
respond to these additional tasks.
- The extent to which the military can get involved in
reconstruction and rehabilitation should be considered
in terms of available civilian skills and expertise. A
proper division of roles and functions between the
military units and civilian agencies should be negotiated
in a local operational context.
- Dealing with unarmed civilians requires restraints of
force and conciliatory measures based on dialogue
and mediation. The integration of peacekeeping roles
into community building requires partnerships with
the local population.
- Reform of the military/police education system requires
an emphasis on human rights issues and democratic
3oversight of the security sector.
- The international community lacks a comprehensive
strategy for conflict resolution and security sector
reform in the post-conflict and reconstruction
environment.
4. General recommendations
The international community should consider the
implementation of the following actions to assist in the
process of security sector reform:
- SSR is likely to succeed if the institutional structures
provided in a peace agreement are acceptable to the
warring parties, and they respond not just to their
security needs but also to their more fundamental
political aspirations. At a minimum, these aspirations
must be transformed, so that they can be accommodated
within the new structures.
- In order to be successful, SSR requires the presence of
strong leadership that can create a broad consensus to
marginalize ”spoilers” and prevent their agenda from
assuming a dominant position in public discourse and
in the political process.
- International criminals and terrorists exploit states
with poorly functioning security sectors to harbor
their activities. This must provide increased incentive
to regional and international actors to assist such states
to reform their security sectors on an urgent and
comprehensive basis to prevent the spread of cross-
border crime and international terrorism.
- SSR must include the military, security intelligence,
border control and financial control functions along
with the usual law enforcement, judicial and corrections
functions as an integrated system based on the
principles of rule-of-law and civilian control.
- The reform process must go beyond institutional reform
and include the transformation of public security
attitudes from ones of fear, disrespect or disinterest to
ones of trust, cooperation and voluntary compliance.
- International and regional peacekeeping and peace
support forces which are often deployed as surrogate
security institutions to states characterized by political,
legal and security vacuums, should be used more
effectively. They have to support the broader aims of
security sector reform, without compromise to their
security role and their requirements for force protection.
The positive model as a functioning security institution,
which an international force typically represents,
should be exploited as a benchmark for the local
reform process.
- International forces should be encouraged, and
resources provided, to engage more fully with the
local population. Their specialized personnel (e.g.
legal, medical, religious, engineering, communications,
public affairs, logistics, education and administrative
officers) should be encouraged to engage with their
local counterparts.
- An overall reconciliation process should serve as the
foundation for re-structuring the security forces as
legitimate and democratically directed institutions.
- Coordination must be improved among all armed
forces (among international actors, and between them
and local actors), and a lead actor (or force contributor/
component) that will be perceived as unbiased by all
conflict parties must be identified.
- Media and other opinion-makers must advocate the
need for improving inter-ethnic relations and eventually
equal ethnic and minority representation among the
security forces.
5. Specific recommendations for donors
Most donors focus on narrower SSR objectives and
face real dilemmas in providing focused and effective
assistance in response to the wide agenda, and multifaceted
needs, of national capacity building in the formulation
and implementation of reformed security policies. On
the one hand, this reflects the immense difficulties of
working in post-war environments, which lends itself to
”crisis management” approaches. On the other hand, it
stems from the lack of a shared understanding within the
donor community of what SSR means, from conflicting
donor objectives, and weak internal capacity in this area.
In view of developing more coherent and sustainable
programmes of assistance for SSR, the following
recommendations should be embraced by donors:
- It is crucial to develop a shared understanding among
national and international partners of what SSR means,
the objectives of external assistance, and how these
can be achieved.
- In countries with weak institutions and persisting
tensions, greater emphasis must be placed on preparing
the political terrain for SSR before encouraging
ambitious and sensitive institutional reforms.
- Prior to designing appropriate steps of SSR, a thorough
needs-assessment is necessary, preferably done by
teams that combine international and local actors (and
stake holders).
- Appropriate timeframes and normative frameworks
for SSR must be developed, which allow space for
local norms and conceptions of security to adapt to
international standards of security-sector governance.
- SSR assistance must be integrated more effectively
into wider post-conflict reconstruction strategies,
particularly with respect to macro-economic sta-
bilization and adjustment programmes.
- Strategic coordination on SSR issues must be enhanced
by building an ”up-stream” culture of co-operation
through political dialogue and joint policymaking
initiatives.
4- Strategic reform efforts must be facilitated at the
national level by prioritizing activities that develop
and enhance human resources. An appropriate balance
has to be negotiated between external ”models” of
SSR and local interests and capacity.
6. Region-specific recommendations
Most of the main challenges outlined above apply at
the international level, yet responses to these challenges
must be tailored to the characteristics of the regional (or
local) environment in which they take place. The following
recommendations reflect on regional experiences that
served as case studies for this report.
Chile
Given the country’s very young democratic experience,
security sector reform in Chile cannot happen in a vacuum.
The government needs to follow a multi-pronged strategy:
(1) engage the armed forces in discussions on the need for
reform; (2) develop a correlation of political forces
necessary to enlist the opposition and pro-military political
sectors into acquiescing to reforms; (3) address human
rights organizations’ demands for justice; and (4) foster
public appreciation for the need for national reconciliation.
Subsequently, military reform must focus on the
establishment of civilian supremacy over the armed
forces; presidential prerogatives; regarding appointments,
promotions, and retirements; civilian control over civil
and militarized police forces; military accountability of
intelligence and security agencies (including the budget);
new curricula in military academies, in accordance with
democratic theory; civilian oversight over the nature,
shape and extent of military training abroad; and greater
control and accountability over military courts.
Colombia
The security sector in Colombia must be considered in
the context of ongoing conflict characterized by drug
trade (producers and processors), leftist guerrillas, and
the so-called paramilitaries. The police originally had
responsibility for countering the drug trade. Despite
some successes by the police in the past, the drug trade is
currently thriving. The leftist guerrillas both occupy land
and are extremely active. The paramilitaries are also
becoming increasingly active and powerful. There is no
option, therefore, but for the armed forces to become
directly involved in the struggles against these actors in
the conflict.
The Colombian armed forces are becoming an
increasingly prominent actor in the society, but the
civilian government cannot keep pace. Indeed, civilians
seem largely uninterested in the armed forces and the
way in which they fight the various actors in Columbia’s
numerous conflict fronts. Security sector reform in
Colombia should include not only the security forces –
police and armed forces – but also the civilians. They
need to develop the culture, structures, and processes
whereby they can participate, and indeed control, the
major changes taking place in the armed forces.
Foreign governments and non-governmental actors
have a role to play in assisting the government of Colombia
in this regard. There should be a level of coordination so
that these international programs are most effective in
assisting the Colombians and are not directed only at
some particular segments of the society.
Pakistan
The Pakistani army is the primary political institution
in the country. Reform of the Pakistani security sector –
the army, the intelligence services, and the police – is
therefore tantamount to reform of the country’s political
process.
The first critical step in security sector reform may
involve the creation of an effective civilian interlocutor
for the military. With the old generation of politicians in
exile, and the leaders of the radical Islamic parties
sidelined or under arrest, there is no remaining credible
civilian political leadership in Pakistan. The only civilian
groups that retain any credibility are a number of non-
governmental organizations that revolve around promi-
nent civilian personalities such as cricketer Imran Khan
or human rights advocate Asma Jehangir. President Gen.
Musharraf and his backers outside Pakistan should now
work towards promoting a ”national dialogue” that will
involve not just representatives from the military, but
also from the key sectors in Pakistani society, particularly
business, agriculture, the religious leadership, media,
and advocates of human rights and democratic reform.
The army will continue to be an important national
institution in Pakistan, and the only one to have the
secular discipline necessary to bring the country back
from the brink. The long-term challenge that the army
will face will not be to develop greater professionalism or
better standards of service, but to facilitate the formation
of alternative national institutions that can take on its
current political roles. A gradual transition away from
military rule through a strong civilian presidency rather
than a potentially chaotic parliament, as proposed earlier,
may give the army leadership the time they need to bring
about this profound conceptual evolution.
Another great challenge for Pakistan is to curb and
reform its bloated, and at times rogue, intelligence agency.
This is one area where Pakistan’s international friends –
particularly the United States – will have to stand clearly
behind military reformers who wish to bring the agency
within more manageable parameters. The national
dialogue could establish an appropriate role and governing
structure for Pakistani intelligence. The US, above all
5others, will then have to work closely with Pakistan’s
military and intelligence community to provide support
for this re-structuring. By the same token, US pressure,
and the threat of sticks as well as the promise of carrots,
will be essential to ensuring good behavior on part of
Pakistani intelligence.
Cambodia
Military reform needs to be conducted at least in part
in conjunction with civil society reform. Removing a
large number of people from a safety net such as the
military and leaving them to fend for themselves can
create social upheaval, particularly in societies such as
Cambodia where formal dispute resolution mechanisms
such as the courts are manifestly corrupt. Demobilized
soldiers need to be assured that their land will not be
illegally seized by corrupt officials or their businesses
will not be illegally taxed. If such activities continue
unchecked, it is likely they will turn to violence – the only
dispute resolution that they have hitherto known.
An accurate database of everyone on the military
payroll needs to be compiled. The people then need to be
categorized as able-bodied serving soldiers, veterans,
disabled and dependants. The able-bodied should remain
on the military register and be dealt with under
demobilization while the balance should be transferred
to a civilian social services department and dealt with
there. Funding should be allocated to deal with both
groups. In Cambodia 18,000 people have been transferred
from the military payroll to the Ministry of Women’s and
Veteran’s affairs – but no extra funding has been allocated
to deal with them.
Further, weapons cantonment needs to be an integral
part of any demobilization program. Once the
demobilization phase is underway there needs to be
continual spot checks, audits and follow-up interviews to
ensure that the program is on track and being conducted
in the manner initially agreed to.
There needs to be a willingness on the part of donors
to cease funding and, if need be, cancel programs when
collaboration is not forthcoming. Countries such as
Cambodia cannot afford to run up debts to enrich a few
corrupt politicians, while at the same time squandering
opportunities to reform. It would be better to defer such
projects until there is the political will to implement them
properly.
Central and Eastern Europe, and Russia
The establishment of democratic control of civil-
military relations is a key element of the security sector
reform agenda in the post-communist countries. Most of
the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have
been successful in establishing the institutional bases for
civil authority over the military. Nevertheless, specific
problems remain, such as a lack of parliamentary scrutiny
and a preponderance of the military over civilian advisers
in defense ministries.
The enlargements of NATO and the EU with CEE
countries have to be coordinated more closely with an
increased formalization of the ”linkages” that already
exist between the two institutions. More programs must
focus on promoting public engagement in the conduct of
military affairs (simultaneously with changing attitudes
and emphasizing a democratic culture).
In Russia, emphasis should be put on modernization,
professionalization, improved coordination, separation
of tasks (specialization), and downsizing rather than
structural reform. The need for better separation of tasks
and coordination within the security sector, especially
between the Armed Forces on the one hand, and Internal
Troops and other MVD structures on the other hand, has
been most vividly demonstrated in post-conflict settings
within Russia (in the North Caucasus). Further
specialization of the MVD Troops and special units in
post-conflict security tasks, as opposed to military support
or regular police functions, should be encouraged. While
modernization (in terms of equipment, arms, training and
logistics) remains an absolute priority, downsizing should
not be viewed as a goal in itself (for MVD and other
militarized force structures, this imperative, although
important, is less pressing than for the Armed Forces).
Russia’s humanitarian relief agency (EMERCOM),
the most efficiently organized of all state forces, could be
more widely used abroad, especially in cases when
Russia’s military or peacekeeping involvement is
unwelcome, politically problematic and undesirable for
Russia itself. This has already been effectively
demonstrated by EMERCOM deployment into Kabul
(Afghanistan).
Priority should be given to practical cooperation in the
field, which is less controversial politically, could be
very instructive logistically (in terms of modernization
of management, equipment, communications capacities)
and might have wider institutional implications. Based
on its own experience in the North Caucasus, the UN, for
instance, has proposed to the Russian government to
create a regional security unit, following the RUBOP/
UBOP model (MVD regional units targeting organized
crime) and dedicated to UN and associated humanitarian
operations in the region.
Liberia/Sierra Leone/South Africa
External actors such as Germany should join the USA,
UK and France in the training of post-conflict Armed
Forces of Liberia and Sierra Leone. They should assist
materially in the demobilization, disarmament and re-
integration of ex-combatants, particularly child soldiers.
In doing so, they should liaise with prominent NGOs
6(such as Save the Children Sweden or Save the Children
UK) already working in the region.
Through the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, external governments should assist existing
Peace Support Training Centres (PSTCs), such as the one
in Kenya, to boost PSO capacity through specific funds
to support peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. They should
assist in the humanitarian de-mining in Sierra Leone; and
sponsor and exchange military officers attending PSO
courses either in the existing PSTCs in Africa or elsewhere.
In South Africa, both civilian and military personnel
should be involved in the process of defense management.
Apart from the political benefits of such a strategy
(increased legitimacy and more extensive civil-military
dialogue, for example), it also provides for a richer
defense product harnessing the competencies of a range
of non-military and non-technocratic actors.
Reform should, somewhat self-evidently, provide for
the cost-effective management of the security sector.
This is often difficult to accomplish given the tension
between budgetary constraints on the one hand and an
increased demand for services from the security sector on
the other. No instant blueprint exists for remedying this
tension, but creative approaches can nevertheless be
adopted. These may include the implementation of
cheaper, and often militarily more effective, defense
strategies such as civilian-based defense, doctrines of
irregular warfare, and an emphasis on lighter and more
mobile, rather than heavier and more technologically
sophisticated, armed forces.
Reform should not adversely affect the operational
readiness and the institutional capabilities of the armed
forces that are being restructured. The success of the
transformation process will be measured by the extent to
which it maximizes the ability of the institution to deliver
its services. Restructuring should provide for the optimal
development of human resources during the
transformation process. The successful management of
the long-term consequences of a security sector
transformation process is critically dependent on the
policy coherence, competencies, management abilities
and transformational leadership qualities within the
institution. These are qualities that remain under-
developed in African governments in general and, to a
lesser extent, within the armed forces in particular, and
require prioritization if transformation is to prove
successful.
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